This paper examines the policy dilemmas and challenges faced by developing country governments when confronted with rising food prices, especially when it comes to the prices of basic foods such as rice and corn. One option for governments is to let domestic prices adjust to reflect the full change in international prices. However, this generates inflationary pressures, and if poor households lack savings or access to credit and social safety nets are inadequate, high food prices can cause severe hardship. Countries with large international reserves could mitigate these effects by appreciating their currency. But an exchange rate appreciation hurts the tradable sector and may cause macroeconomic imbalances down the road. Alternatively, governments can use food subsidies or export restrictions to stabilize domestic prices, shifting the burden of adjustment back on to international markets. The former measures exacerbate global food price fluctuations, hence are a "beggar-thy-neighbor" policy response which undermines a rules-based trading system and reduces welfare particularly in food importing countries. Without a multilateral solution to food price volatility in international markets, however, it is not surprising that developing countries pursue what is perceived as best for them even if the rest of the world is made worse off. With the introduction of biofuels, food commodity prices are likely to behave more like industrial commodity prices, so episodes of rapidly rising food commodity prices are bound to happen more frequently in the future. Biofuels not only lead to a rise in the long-term price of food staples but will also make food prices much more sensitive to the business-cycle much more than in the past. "Beggar-thyneighbor" policies will become a common practice every time nonrenewable energy prices go up.
Lanka for a similar period.
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When confronted with rising food prices governments in developing countries face difficult policy dilemmas, especially when it comes to the prices of basic foods such as rice and corn. One option is to let domestic prices adjust to reflect the full change in international prices, shifting the burden of adjustment to their own private sector. Since food represents a relatively large share of developing countries' consumption baskets, this causes inflationary pressures and hurts the living standards of poor net consumers. 6 Countries with large international reserves could mitigate these effects by appreciating their currency. However, an exchange rate appreciation hurts the tradable sector 7 and may cause macroeconomic imbalances down the road. Governments could also use safety nets to protect the poor from rising prices. However, in many developing countries safety nets are lacking or inadequate. In addition, safety nets for the poor do not help contain inflationary pressures or protect households in the middle of the distribution who are hurt by high food prices too. Alternatively, governments can use food subsidies or export restrictions to stabilize domestic prices, shifting the burden of adjustment back on to international markets. The former measures exacerbate global food price fluctuations, hence are a "beggar-thy-neighbor" policy response which undermines a rulesbased trading system. While administrative measures have costs for the countries that implement them, these may be smaller than the alternative, particularly when prices are subject to large fluctuations within short time periods. Without a multilateral solution to food price volatility in international markets, it is not surprising that developing countries pursue what is perceived as best for them even if the rest of the world is made worse off.
Using the recent period of rising food commodities prices, this paper examines the policy dilemmas and challenges faced by developing country governments when confronted with volatile food prices. It starts with an overview of the main drivers of the acceleration in food price increases especially since 2004. The paper goes on to show that rising food prices caused significant inflationary pressures and increased poverty. Section 3 presents a sample of the complex policy dilemmas and challenges that governments in developing countries face.
Section 4 presents concluding remarks. By and large, the performance of agriculture over the past twenty five years has been viewed as a success story. Between 1980 and 2004 , output grew at an average of 2 percent per year and prices fell at an average of 1.6 percent. 9 Due to supply-side constraints arising from land and water scarcity and slow technical progress, 10 this success story was about to come to 8 Given the methodological difficulties involved, however, an attempt to estimate the exact contribution of each of these factors using econometrics or a comprehensive simulation model would be an impossible task. 9 World Bank (2007) , p. 51. Low prices were also the consequence of agricultural support policies in the European Union and the United States (IFPRI, 2003) . 10 In the more densely populated areas of the world-primarily Asia--the land frontier has been exhausted. In Latin America there is still room for land expansion but this often comes at the expense of tropical and subtropical forests. While in Sub-Saharan Africa there is great potential for land expansion, this would require large investments in infrastructure, human capital and agricultural extension. Water is likely to become increasingly scarce and irrigated agriculture would have to compete with the demand from larger and larger industrial sectors and urban centers. Climate change is likely to worsen the availability of arable land and water for agricultural use. Slowed R&D spending cautions one to expect technological breakthroughs any time soon. The supply-side constraints had already started to manifest themselves as a decline in the growth rates of yields of major cereal crops in developing countries. A closer analysis of what happened to demand and supply in the markets for grains and oilseeds from 2000 onwards may help explain this unexpected hike in prices. Table 2 summarizes the trends in harvested area, yields, food consumption, industrial use and stocks-touse ratios for corn, rice, wheat and oilseeds. Evidence suggests that there was a steady decline in harvested area (for corn and wheat in particular) at the beginning of the decade, a likely result of low prices in the past. 12 Bad weather had a negative impact on yields and, in specific years, the yields fell below trend for wheat and rice in particular. However, the harvested area for corn, for example, rose sharply in response to higher prices and by mid-decade there were record global crops for corn and oilseeds. These trends seem to indicate that supply was gradually responding to incentives and bad weather was neither generalized nor persistent. Between 2000 and 2007, for all grains, harvested area grew at 0.4 percent and yield grew at 1.3 percent per year, which equals a 1.7 percent annual growth in supply.
The Causes of Food Commodities Price Volatility

13
On the demand side, consumption for food (including animal feed) of corn, wheat and rice was for the most part on trend. There were no surges in consumption on the part of China or India (or by developing countries in the aggregate) for corn, wheat or rice. The exception is oilseeds (soybeans in particular) for which the demand from China increased above trend.
Demand for food consumption (including animal feed) for all grains grew at 1.7 percent per year from 2000 to 2007. 14 Hence, excluding the demand for industrial use (biofuels), supply and demand grew at the same pace.
In contrast, after legislation on mandates, tariffs, and subsidies was passed in the EU and the US 15 , the demand for corn and vegetable oils for industrial use (biofuels) rose above trend and at an increasing rate. (Figure 3 Timmer (2008) estimates that lower prices in the previous decade explain around 53 percent of the increase. On the harvested area and yield by crop see, for example, Abbott et al. (2008) . Also, see Naylor and Falcon (2008) . 13 Mitchell (2008 Figure 4 we can observe how price increases of corn and soybeans accelerated after the demand for corn-based ethanol experienced its rapid increase.
In quantitative terms, the contribution of biofuels to the rise in food commodities prices has been estimated or calculated using different time periods and prices, different coverage of food products, and different methodologies. 18 The general conclusion that emerges from these exercises is that the contribution of the expansion of biofuels to observed price increases is quantitatively significant. Collins (2008) estimated that around 60 percent of the increase in maize prices from 2006 to 2008 may have been due to the increase in maize used in ethanol.
19 Mitchell (2008) concludes that 70-75 percent increase in food commodities prices was due to biofuels and factors such as low grain stocks, large land use shifts, speculative activity and export bans. 20 Using a general equilibrium model, Rosegrant, et al. (2008) estimated the impact of the acceleration in biofuel production on weighted cereal prices from 2000 to 2007 to be 30 percent in real terms.
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How much of the increase in food commodities prices was caused by policy-induced increases in demand for biofuels as opposed to market forces such as higher gasoline prices (derived from higher oil prices)? According to McPhail and Babcock (2008) eliminating federal 22 tax credits (for blending ethanol in gas) and tariffs-and, to a much lesser extent, mandates-in the United States would reduce ethanol production by 18.6 percent and the price of corn would decline by 14.5 percent. While significant, this leaves a large portion of the increase unexplained. If gasoline prices are sufficiently high, the production of biofuels may be profitable even without the mandates, tax credits and the like. According to McPhail and Babcock (2008) 23 , even if government support policies at the federal level are eliminated, if gas prices equal 3 dollars per gallon or higher, ethanol production would rise from the current levels 16 Ibid. 17 Author's calculations based on data from the PSD Database, USDA. 18 For example, computable general equilibrium models (Rosegrant et al., 2008) or partial equilibrium analysis (Collins, 2008) or estimated as an accounting residual (Mitchell, 2008) . 19 Mitchell (2008), p. 4. 20 Ibid., p. 16. 21 Also, in the short-run, the IMF estimated that the increased demand for biofuels accounted for 70 percent of the increase in maize prices and 40 percent of the increase in soybean prices (Lipsky, May 8, 2008) . A recent OECD report (OECD, 2008) calculates that "current biofuel support measures are estimated to increase average wheat, maize and vegetable oil prices by about 5%, 7% and 19%, respectively, in the medium term" (p.9). 22 In addition to policies at the federal level, there are mandates and other policies at the state level which also affect ethanol and biodiesel production. 26 This is not proof that the same increase in biofuels production would have existed without government support. It is still possible that without the tax credits or protection from imports, the production of biofuels at those same prices would have been lower. According to Naylor and Falcon (2008) , in the absence of government support policies, oil prices would have to be high enough and corn prices low enough to make ethanol production profitable at 65 percent the price of gas . "…[E]thanol has only about two-thirds the energy of gasoline. In other words, rational consumers would pay only about 65% of the price of gasoline for their ethanol, since their cars would go only about 65% as far on a tank of fuel. Since ethanol must be shipped and stored separately, substantial new infrastructure would be needed to make it a large-scale choice for fuel, and autos would require so-called "flex" technology to use fuel containing high percentages of ethanol." 27 For an estimate of the order of magnitude of the impact of past prices on current prices see Timmer (2008) . 28 For example, in 2007 harvested area for corn in the US rose by 23 percent "… in response to high maize prices and rapid demand growth for maize for ethanol production. This expansion resulted in a 16 percent decline in soybean area … which reduced soybean production and contributed to a 75 percent rise in soybean prices between April 2007 and April 2008." (Mitchell, 2008, p. 10 ) See Naylor and Falcon (2008) for a description of the interaction between ethanol and corn, soybean and wheat price. 29 One of the reasons of why this is important is because if the factors are other than the fundamentals of demand and supply (inflationary expectations or a "bubble"), the behavior of commodity prices during the first half of 2008 would have been misleading. Their rapid increase was interpreted as a validation of the "decoupling" theory (that the rest of the world would not be seriously affected by the US slowdown) and let to the implementation of anti-inflationary measures when the world was on the verge of a big collapse in demand. macroeconomic factors such as the depreciation of the dollar and lower interest rates in the United States, speculation, and interventionist policies on the part of developing countries since mid-2007.
There is casual evidence that the price index of non-oil dollar commodities and the real value of the dollar have been inversely related. 30 ( Figure 6 ) As shown in Figure 7 , however, commodity prices rose in all major currencies. This is an indication that factors other than the depreciation of the dollar played a significant role. However, it is quite possible that the depreciation of the dollar may have affected the short-run dynamics of commodity prices because of higher demand stemming from countries whose currencies appreciated vis-à-vis the dollar. Available estimates put the commodity price elasticity with respect to the real value of the dollar between 0.5 and 1.0. 31 Using the mid-point of these elasticities and the trade-weighted depreciation of the dollar, Mitchell (2008) argues that the contribution of dollar weakness to the increase in commodity prices between January 2000 and June 2008 could be of the order of 20 percent (.75 times 26 percent). 32 However, the selection of the mid-point is as good as any other; based on the above elasticities the range would go from 13 to 26 percent.
Since the acceleration in commodity price increases coincided with the onset of the subprime crisis in mid-2007, could the two events be related? Frankel (2008b) argues that the fact that commodity prices rose across the board calls for some macroeconomic explanation. For a while, the most popular macro explanation was rapid growth in the world economy. However, since mid-2007 (and until mid-2008) price rises accelerated even though the global economy was slowing down.
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According to Frankel (2006) , Calvo (2008) and others, one of the explanations may be the Federal Reserve's decision to lower interest rates since mid-2007.
Lower interest rates increase the demand for or reduce the supply of storable commodities 30 According to Mundell (2002) : "[A] casual reading of the statistics suggests that this relationship is quite close. Thus the index of non-oil dollar commodities tripled in the 1970s when the dollar was depreciating sharply relative to the SDR; it then fell by more than 20 per cent from 1980 to 1986 when the dollar was soaring; then it rose by 50 per cent from 1986 to 1995 when the dollar was again depreciating; and it has fallen by 30 per cent since 1995 when the dollar has been appreciating. There is therefore a very pronounced association of the cycle of the dollar against other major currencies (as measured by the SDR) with the cycle of dollar commodity prices." 31 Gilbert (1989) and Baffes (1997) . 32 We must bear in mind, also, that causality runs both ways. A productivity boost generated by all-purpose technology such as the IT "revolution" would result in an appreciation of the currency of the leader in the use of such technology and a reduction of commodity prices. On the contrary, an exogenous increase in commodity prices will put downward pressure (i.e., towards depreciation) on the currency of importing countries. If part of the increase in commodity prices (food and nonfood) is determined by exogenous factors (such as rapid growth in China), this would have put downward pressure on the dollar. However, this would have been countered by the rise in prices of commodities where the US is a major exporter. But because the US is a net importer of commodities, it suffered a decline in its terms of trade of about 7. through a variety of channels: by decreasing the incentive for pumping oil, mining gold, logging forests, culling cattle, etc. today rather than tomorrow; by increasing the desire to hold inventories; and, by encouraging investors (or speculators if you wish) to shift out of Treasury Bills and into other assets such as foreign currencies, emerging market stocks, other securities, and commodities-including food commodities.
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The specific mechanism proposed in Frankel's model is the following. 35 Commodity prices are determined by a number of factors including investors' asset portfolio decisions. The decision whether to hold a commodity for another period (on the ground, in the trees or in the form of inventories) or to sell it at today's price, deposit the proceeds and earn interest, depends on the interest rate and the expectations about prices in the future. Thus, through arbitrage conditions, the relative price of a commodity (vis-a-vis its long-term equilibrium) is inversely related to the real interest rate. When interest rates are low money flows out of interest-bearing instruments and into foreign currencies, emerging market stocks, other securities, and commodities-including food commodities. This portfolio shift drives the prices of these assets higher and higher until they reach a level where people perceive that they lie "sufficiently"
above their future long-run equilibrium level. Monetary policy causes real commodity prices to rise initially (they increase more than proportionately than the increase in money supply, for example) because other prices are "sticky" (or, in other words, they rise at a slower speed).
Because of the different speeds of price adjustments and arbitrage conditions regarding price expectations and interest rates, commodity prices (and the prices of other assets) overshoot.
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The role of expansionary monetary policies in explaining rising commodity prices in the aftermath of the sub-prime crisis has also been suggested by the Latin American Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (CLAAF). 37 According to the Committee, "…[W]hile a monetary explanation focuses essentially on absolute price changes, it may also accommodate the possibility of a transitory increase in relative prices. More precisely, an increase in inflation, in its initial stages, tends to manifest itself as a non uniform process. In particular, commodity prices react faster than wages and prices of domestically produced services. Therefore, in the short run, a rise in the rate of inflation will bring about an increase in the relative price of commodities vis-à-vis less flexible prices. It is worth noting that the monetary explanation implies that, in the long run, there will be no major relative price change. Thus, the entire episode might resemble a price bubble. Furthermore, the increase in commodity prices becomes 34 See Frankel (2008a, b, and c) for his comments and exchange with other economists on this issue. 35 The full model is presented in Frankel (1986) . 36 There has been a lot of debate about whether speculation contributed to the acceleration of commodity prices. If one considers "speculation" any decision that is based on the expectations of the behavior of prices in the future, the process described above could be included as part of speculative activities. prices fell by 27 percent. This casts some doubt on the theory that commodity prices increased due to inflationary expectations caused by the Fed's decision to lower interest rates. This is an area that deserves further research.
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The sharp decline in nominal commodity prices observed since mid-2008 is also consistent with the presence of a price bubble incentivized by lower interest rates in the United
States. The importance of expansionary monetary policy or financial speculation as a cause of the acceleration of the commodity price increases has been dismissed because, if that were the case, one would have observed an increase in stocks of commodities-including food commodities. 41 However, in the case of certain commodities such as oil or metals, stocks can be accumulated in "invisible" ways: by drilling or mining less. In the case of agricultural commodities, this option does not really exist because one cannot accumulate them by simply not harvesting a crop. But, as Calvo (2008) has argued, in the face of highly inelastic demand, the desired level of stocks may increase, but given the short run inelastic nature of supply, this may express itself through rising prices rather than higher stocks. 42 Furthermore, it is probably naïve to think that stocks accumulated by sovereign governments are public knowledge in full. 43 Finally, because of the recently created link between food commodities and fossil fuels through 38 Also, see Rojas-Suarez (2008) . 39 Frankel (2006) . 40 Another factor which has been mentioned to explain the acceleration in commodity price increases since mid-2007 is speculation in financial markets and the rise in the participation of index funds. So far, the evidence for this is very limited. World Bank (2008c) 41 See, for example, Krugman (2008) . 42 Note, by the way, that government interventions to restrict exports and expand subsidies contributed to the inelasticity of supply and demand. 43 In addition, in the case of agricultural commodities in particular, accumulation of stocks may be "invisible" because it is done by millions of consumers buying additional amounts which although small individually, can add up and put upward pressure on prices. If, for example, if we take half of the population of India, China, Indonesia and Bangladesh (a total of 1,428,658,500 persons, WEO data) and assume an increase in the amount of rice bought by consumers of 10 kilos per year per person, this would result in an increase in demand in the order of 14,286,585,000 kilos or 14,286,585 tons. With world rice production at 430.72 million tons in 2008 (USDA) this represents 3.3% of world production or 5% of the production in these four countries (which in 2008/2009 is estimated at 292 million tons, USDA). In addition, export restrictions imposed by governments are tantamount to a form of speculation because they also restrict supply available in world markets.
the biofuels nexus, part of the impact of lower interest rates on food commodities prices may be indirect (that is, there is no need to observe an accumulation of their inventories).
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The pattern of a sharp increase followed by a sharp fall in commodity prices is also consistent with changes in fundamentals. While investors expected the world economy to continue growing despite the US slowdown, they also expected the returns to non-US assets, including commodities, to rise. When in mid-2008 investors started to realize that the economic slowdown would be much more severe and global, the expectations went into the opposite direction and commodity prices began to fall.
It is important to bear in mind that the explanations of the acceleration in commodity price increases based on real vs. monetary factors, though clearly distinct, are not mutually exclusive. The explanation which emphasizes the workings of physical demand and supply for commodities, considers inflation a consequence of these persistent relative price changes. In contrast, for the monetary explanation, the increase in the relative price of commodities is partly endogenous: a consequence of expansionary monetary policy. But both may be and are likely to have been at play.
Starting in the last quarter of 2007, developing country governments introduced administrative measures to ban or restrict exports and put bids on purchases of food commodities. (Figures 9a and 9b ) These measures exacerbated the upward pressure of food commodities prices in international prices. 45 The impact was particularly strong in the case of rice. 46 In Figure 10 one can observe how acceleration in the price increases of rice coincided with some key countries introducing administrative measures that affected supply or demand. In Africa, the domino effect on other prices did not wait; with rice and other imported cereals in short supply, the price of locally grown crops such as millet and sorghum rose. 47 In an attempt to quantify the impact of administrative measures on world prices, Ivanic, Martin, Mattoo and Subramanian (2008) show that if developing countries try to offset a fifty percent increase in the world prices of rice, corn, wheat and soybeans applying policy responses aimed at restoring individual countries' domestic prices, world market prices will rise by 10 to 30 percentage points. 44 However, correlation is not proof of causality. The spike in prices could also be explained by the nonlinearities present in tight commodity markets which were subject to additional shocks such as the administrative decisions mentioned above (export bans, export taxes, etc.). And the recent fall could be explained by the expected downward pressure on prices resulting from a slowdown in global growth. In addition, the inverse relation between commodity prices and interest rates does not always hold empirically. 45 See Ivanic , Martin, Mattoo and Subramanian (2008) . 46 See Slayton and Timmer (2008) , Naylor and Falcon (2008) . 47 Naylor and Falcon (2008) and the article by Fleshman (2008) .
The fact that food commodities have become a profitable alternative for the production of fossil fuel energy substitutes has important implications. 48 In contrast to food being used for consumption purposes whose income-elasticity is below unity (Engel's Law), the income elasticity for food commodities for industrial purposes could equal unity or more. 49 This turn of events significantly alters the forces at play in food commodities markets and--depending on what happens to oil prices, biofuels subsidies and mandates and research on the agricultural frontier--food could become permanently more expensive in a nontrivial way. argues that with the current growth path of biofuel production, i.e. with the actual expansion plans for biofuels, oilseeds and corn prices would increase by 18 and 26 percent, respectively, by 2020. 50 In contrast, the "business as usual"-that is, without biofuels--scenario 48 By this we mean the use of food commodities to produce energy for cars and machines. 49 The long-run income elasticity of energy and oil has been estimated at approximately 1.0 for the non-OECD countries (Gately and Huntington, 2001) . 50 According to OECD (2008) estimates, a full implementation of the recently enacted US Energy Independence and Security Act and the currently proposed new EU Directive for Renewable Energy, close to 20% of global vegetable oil production and more than 13% of world coarse grain output could shift to biofuels production". The EU directives were revised so their impact needs to be re-estimated. 51 Correlations were estimated using the de-trended monthly series of commodity prices published by It is important to bear in mind that since the reported numbers refer to actual inflation rates, they do not necessarily reflect the "true" inflationary pressures stemming from higher international food commodities prices. Actual inflation not only reflects inflationary dynamics but also the policy measures that governments take to respond to them. These policies can range from restrictive monetary and fiscal policies to interventions in specific markets (e.g., price controls, export bans, consumer subsidies and so on). An indicator that governments faced important inflationary pressures is that several monetary authorities increased interest rates by 25 basis points or more 53 despite its dampening effect on output. Another indicator is that, as mentioned in the previous section, many governments implemented trade, fiscal and administrative policies to contain the increase in domestic food prices. In the absence of these policies, inflation would have been even higher than what was observed.
What is the impact of higher food commodities prices on poverty? Since the poor include both net consumers and net sellers of food commodities, a change in their price in either direction will inevitably hurt some of the poor and benefit some of the poor at the same time.
Small poor farmers tend to benefit from higher food prices. However, the poor in urban areas and those in rural areas with little or no access to land are hurt, and hurt badly, when food prices increase. This contradictory impact of food prices on the poor has been known as the "food price dilemma." 54 This dilemma has been the source of a futile debate regarding when the poor are better off: when food prices go up or when they go down? Policymakers should simply accept that if food prices rise (fall) poor net buyers (net sellers) will need help and poor net sellers (net buyers) will be better off. In either case, safety net programs will have to be expanded in coverage and size to compensate the group of the poor who get hurt. In addition, when food commodities prices increase, there is an opportunity to help poor net sellers translate this windfall into a more long-term improvement in living standards. With respect to the net impact on poverty (i.e., on summary measures such as the headcount ratio, the poverty gap ratio and the poverty gap ratio square), available evidence suggests that among the poorest households, the decline in living standards of net consumers caused by higher food prices outweighs the benefits accruing to net sellers in the majority of countries that have been analyzed so far.
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As a general proposition, the impact on poverty generated by an increase in the price of food will depend on: i. the relative importance of different food commodities in the production set and consumption basket of different households and the difference between the two 56 ; ii. the magnitude of the relative price change; iii. households' ability to substitute between food items;
and, iv. the degree to which households are compensated for the price shocks by changes in their income (i.e., by the indirect effect on wages and employment originated by the price change). 57 Evidence suggests that the poor spend between 50 and 70 percent of their income on food on average 58 , the proportion of poor people who are net buyers of food tends to dominate over the share of net sellers, the increase in domestic food price-though much lower than that observed for international prices--has been significant, although households do substitute more expensive for less expensive food in the case of basic staples this substitution is limited, and the positive effects on wages take time. Table 3 presents a summary of the estimates obtained by a series of recent studies which use different methods, poverty lines and assumptions about price increases, pass-through to domestic prices, substitution effects, and wage effects. Also, some include net sellers while others don't. The orders of magnitude of the estimated short-term impact of higher food prices on poverty are significant. Ivanic and Martin (2008a) show that about 105 million people in the least developed countries have been added to the world's poor since 2005 because of rising food prices. This is equivalent to about 10 percent of the people living on less than a dollar a day 55 Aksoy and Isik-Dikmelik (2008) , for example, argue that many of the poor are net sellers of food commodities so that higher prices is a benefit to them. While this is true, the studies that estimate the full impact (i.e., on net sellers and net buyers), find that higher food prices result in an increase in the headcount and poverty gap ratios in the overwhelming majority of cases (Ivanic and Martin, 2008a; Wodon et al., 2008; Robles et al., 2008; CEPAL, 2008) . 56 For poor farmers, the difference is often positive indicating that they benefit from a price increase. In contrast, poor urban households or landless agricultural workers are net consumers of food commodities and get hurt by an increase in their price. 57 To estimate the latter, one must be able to estimate the spillover effects; this has been done using multi-sectoral and full-fledged computable general equilibrium models. Some CGEs are Walrasian, that is, all markets clear via prices and there is no unemployment. Others are more heterodox: they assume flexible prices in some markets but in others prices are determined as a mark-up above costs and total employment is endogenously determined by the level of aggregate demand. Warr (2008) finds that higher food prices, especially staple grains, worsen poverty incidence in Thailand despite the presence of large numbers of poor farmers, many of whom benefit from higher prices.
Policy Dilemmas caused by Rising Food Prices
Given their impact on inflation and poverty, rising food commodities prices pose significant policy dilemmas to developing countries. The conventional wisdom among 59 Regional numbers for Latin America are own calculations based on Robles et al. (2008) It is important to point out that these estimates on the poverty impact of higher food prices do not take into account the positive effect that higher food commodities prices has had on economic growth in net exporting countries. In these countries, the net effect of the commodity boom may well be a reduction in poverty. At present none of the estimates account for this impact. Since net exporters are fewer and richer than the net importers, the overall impact on poverty may not change much even if the commodity boom-driven growth dividend for net exporters is taken into account. However, future research should also estimate the reduction in poverty caused by commodity-boom induced growth in net exporters. In addition to their impact on macroeconomic performance and poverty, rising food prices were a source of social unrest and created severe budgetary difficulties for food aid programs and made planning for food relief excruciatingly difficult. 63 World Bank (2008c), p. 116. economists is that short-run problems associated with high prices of staple foods are best dealt with by appropriate macroeconomic instruments and targeted safety nets. However, as we shall see below, the policy dilemmas and challenges faced by governments in developing countries are substantial.
To fend off inflationary pressures, monetary authorities have two options: to accommodate the price increases as a one-time spike in the rate of inflation or to stick to the inflation target through tight monetary policy. Tight monetary policy has a dampening effect on economic activity. However, accommodation puts the hard-won credibility of central banks at risk and this risk has to be weighed against the costs of tight monetary policy in terms of foregone output. Also, for countries in which wage and price indexation is common, it will be hard to prevent the initial increase in inflation from becoming entrenched. But given that fulfilling the inflation targets may mean that nonfood prices must fall in nominal terms, governments find it hard not to acquiesce to some degree of accommodation. 64 Without it losses in economic activity are likely and this, in turn, would exacerbate the impact on poverty.
In addition, the recessionary impact of tight monetary policy might reduce the fiscal resources available to compensate the poor through targeted safety nets.
In countries with large international reserves and sound fiscal and external stances, monetary authorities could use part of the reserves to encourage an appreciation of the currency which would immediately reduce the impact of higher international food commodities prices on domestic prices. However, relying on a macroeconomic price such as the exchange rate to deflect inflationary pressures has its costs. It creates disincentives to exporters and hurts importcompeting sectors and, in more extreme cases, it can slow down growth.
The uncertainty regarding the causes and duration of rising food prices make the dilemmas even more complex. In the case where the former are the result of global inflationary pressures associated with US monetary policy, an appreciation of the currency-whenever feasible-is an appropriate response. However, as it was mentioned in section 2, if food commodities price increases are subject to overshooting or are caused by a price bubble, then international prices are reflecting a transient distortion. Under such circumstances, using the heavy artillery of higher interest rates or an appreciation of the currency would result in "overkill." The problem is that in the midst of the process nobody can be sure if the price increases are temporary or what portion of their acceleration reflects a distortion versus global inflation or changes in fundamentals. 64 Even the IMF (2008) has recognized that inflation targets might have to be missed in order to avoid an excessive reduction in output or output growth. Also, see Dervis (2008) .
Suppose now that governments accept the conventional wisdom and want to focus on protecting the poor from the impact of higher domestic food prices. Are developing countries ready? In particular, do safety net programs exist and can they be easily expanded? Do governments have the fiscal space to accommodate the additional resources needed to fund the safety net? Figure 12 presents the safety net programs available in low and middle-income countries by category: cash transfers, food for work, food ration/stamp and school feeding programs. Unfortunately, according to this information, 19 (out of 49) low-income and 49 (out of 95) middle-income countries do not have safety net programs of any kind.
Moreover, given the characteristic of the adverse shock-i.e., an increase in the price of a good that takes up a substantial portion of a poor person's budget-the most adequate safety net is to compensate the affected population for their loss in purchasing power in cash.
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Although cash transfer programs (conditional and unconditional) are increasingly more common, they are still not pervasive. According to Figure 12 there are 16 (out of 49) lowincome and 37 (out of 95) middle-income countries that have cash transfer programs. In the absence of cash transfer programs, countries could resort to school feeding programs. While they will not compensate the poor for the loss of purchasing power associated with higher food prices, school feeding programs can insulate (at least in part) children of poor households from suffering a cut in their food intake as a result of higher food prices. School feeding programs are a bit more common in low-income countries than cash transfer programs but still only 24 low-income countries have them.
In addition to the fact that there are many low-and middle-income countries which do not have safety net programs, those which exist may be too limited in coverage. In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, the coverage of cash transfer programs exceeds 25 percent of the population living in poverty in 8 out of 26 countries: Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico and Panama. The good news is that the two largest countries with the highest number of poor people in the region, Brazil and Mexico, have among the best functioning cash transfer programs in the world. 66 The poorest countries in the region, however, either do not have programs or have them in a limited scale.
Furthermore, most of these programs do not have a mechanism to incorporate the "new"
poor or increase the size of the benefits in the face of adverse shocks as part of their design. 65 Since the problem is loss in purchasing power and not in employment, expanding food-for-work or cash-for-work programs is not the most adequate response and could potentially introduce distortions in the allocation of labor supply on the part of poor households. However, increasing the wage paid in cash-for-work programs is. In sum, the existing safety net systems in developing countries leave much to be desired. In too many countries it is either inexistent or small; and, even in countries in which cash transfer programs are large and effective in addressing chronic poverty, they are not designed to respond to shocks. This means that the majority of the poor who have been hurt or those who have become poor as a result of higher food prices were not being protected from the impact of higher food prices on their living standards. In cases in which these programs were expanded, this was done as an ad hoc measure implemented many months (or even years) after food price increases appeared on the scene. In addition, low-income countries in particular may not have the fiscal space to finance an expansion let alone launch new safety net programs.
There is no available data in the public domain as to how many countries may be in such position.
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Confronted with lacking or inadequate safety nets, unpalatable macroeconomic choices, and uncertainty about the evolution of international food commodities prices, governments throughout the developing world implemented a series of administrative policies designed to insulate domestic food prices from their fluctuations in world markets. More than 80 developing countries for which data is available put in place at least one of the following: reduced import tariffs or other taxes, relaxed import restrictions, increased general consumer subsidies, raised export taxes, or introduced price controls, export restrictions or outright bans. (Figure 9a ) The World Bank surveyed 118 countries and found that the most frequently adopted policies were food price controls, reduced food taxes, and consumption subsidies. 69 (Figure 9b ) Also, about a third of the countries implemented export restrictions. These measures were implemented even by countries with adequate safety net programs. 70 This should not come as a surprise. Targeted safety nets do not help contain inflationary pressures or social discontent among low-income 67 There is evidence that Ethiopia increased the wage rate in its cash-for-work program and that other poor countries have relied on food-for-work, food distribution and school feeding programs to transfer resources to the poor. For a discussion on this see Revenga (2008) . 68 IMF (2008) indicates which countries need the IMF because of balance of payments vulnerability but there is no indication how many countries may need it to expand or implement a safety net. 69 See, for example, Revenga (2008) , Ivanic and Martin (2008b) and Wodon and Zaman (2008) . 70 Mexico, for example, increased the size of the transfers in its cash transfer program but it also lowered tariffs on agricultural goods and inputs, implemented some forms of "soft" price controls and increased general subsidies on some food staples.
urban workers who are not poor enough to be included in the safety net system but are hurt by rising food prices.
With the exception of import-liberalizing and tax reducing policies, the rest has elicited quite a bit of criticism from multilateral institutions. The former are more acceptable to the mainstream because they are considered to be efficiency-enhancing and consistent with a rulesbased trading system. Heterodox measures such as export restrictions, general subsidies or price controls raise concern because they distort producers' and consumers' response, defer and may worsen inflationary pressures, and can channel large amounts of scarce government resources to the non-poor. However, reducing tariffs and taxes also lowers government revenues which may not be desirable for countries facing fiscal imbalances. It addition, it is not infrequent that countries face political resistance to apply an ad valorem tax on food staples so once they are lowered it may be very difficult to raise them in the future. All of these administrative measures-including reducing import tariffs and other taxes on food items--exacerbate the upward pressure on commodity prices hurting food commodity importers and, in the extreme, can be self-defeating. However, an appreciation of the currency, a policy that has been recommended by some mainstream macroeconomists, could also exacerbate the upward pressure on international prices.
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The "best" policy option for individual countries will depend on two crucial factors:
what the government's objective function is and where it enjoys the most degrees of freedom.
If a government is concerned about containing inflation and at the same preserving the credibility of the central bank, it may choose a policy path that is different from that of a government whose objective is to minimize the impact on the poor or to maintain social and political stability in the urban areas under limited fiscal and institutional resources. Countries with large international reserves, robust safety nets and fiscal space will choose a policy mix that is different from countries that have none of these. The fact that so many governmentsfrom populist Argentina to conservative Mexico to pragmatic China, for example--chose to use administrative measures may be an indication that-despite their costs-they were viewed as the best option under the circumstances. 71 Even safety nets to the poor could put upward pressure on international prices. However, the increase in demand for food resulting from an expansion of safety nets is bound to be lower than, for instance, general consumption subsidies or price controls. In addition, safety nets do not lower the price to the supplier allowing for a positive response on their part to take place. 72 The choice of which specific administrative measures to use should be based on "common sense" criteria. For example, governments should choose those price policy interventions which are more easily reversed (that is, they do not become hijacked by special interest groups), least distortionary, least regressive, more consistent with a rulesbased trading system, simple to implement from an administrative point of view and do not cause unsustainable fiscal imbalances. In this process government are likely to face complex and difficult to quantify trade-offs.
Concluding remarks
Starting in 2002, international food commodities prices experienced large fluctuations.
When prices were rising, developing countries faced significant policy dilemmas. Confronted with inflationary pressures, increasing poverty and social unrest, the vast majority of governments introduced beggar-thy-neighbor policies that reduced the welfare of particularly food-importing countries and undermined a rules-based trading system. This elicited substantial criticism from multilateral organizations and mainstream economists. Rather than trying to insulate domestic prices-it is argued-, governments should let prices adjust to reflect the change in international prices and use targeted safety nets to compensate the poor. However, as we saw above, safety nets in many developing countries are lacking or inadequate. If they are to be used in future episodes of rising food prices, they need to be put in place now. In particular, multilateral organizations should work with governments to implement cash transfer programs so that the poor can quickly and efficiently be compensated for the loss in purchasing power when food prices rise. It is essential that the new or existing programs are designed in such a way so that they can increase (decrease) the size of the transfer and the number of beneficiaries when the shock occurs (unwinds). That is, they should include an "insurance" component; this is not a feature which current programs have. 73 In addition, governments should have mechanisms in place to ensure than when cash transfers need to be expanded, they will have the required fiscal space.
Even if adequate safety nets are in place, however, governments in developing countries would still need to cope with inflationary pressures and social discontent among urban households who are not poor enough to be included in the safety net programs but are hurt by higher food prices. Thus, the temptation to insulate domestic prices with beggar-thy-neighbor administrative measures will continue to exist. Moreover, these measures may not be inadequate if food price volatility in international markets is reflecting transient distortions resulting from global inflationary pressures or a food commodities price bubble. Among interventionist measures, however, some may be less problematic than others. The conventional wisdom in economics is that using taxes, subsidies and tariffs is better than price controls and export bans. But the availability of fiscal resources and political economy dynamics may change the ranking of policies.
As long as food commodities prices are subject to large fluctuations in international markets, it will be difficult to persuade developing countries not to implement measures that exacerbate the upward pressure on them. This will be particularly so in periods of high volatility, when price increases accelerate and governments in developing countries find it difficult to address the challenges to price stability, poverty reduction and social peace that soaring food prices cause. These welfare-decreasing measures could be avoided if international food commodities prices could be stabilized. The international community through a multilateral organization such as the World Food Program should explore how to create a public reserve of food staples to reduce price volatility. 74 Recognizing that such an initiative would be costly and difficult to manage, these costs should be weighed against the benefits in terms of poverty reduction, nutrition and social stability that it would bring. In addition, public reserves could also help correct transient market distortions caused by hoarding, price bubbles or global inflationary pressures.
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74 See the proposal made by Lin (2008) , for example. 75 Dealing with secular upward pressures on international food commodities prices caused by the surge in the production of biofuels will require a different approach. Certainly subsidies for biofuels production in advanced countries should be eliminated. However, if the price of gasoline gets to be high enough, it will be profitable to produce them without subsidies. In this case, countries may have to consider a tax on biofuels production. Otherwise, it will be increasingly difficult to protect the poor in developing countries from the impact of rising food prices. If a currency had appreciated against the USD, then the domestic price increase for these commodities was assumed to be smaller than the increase in $ and we first made that adjustment. If other prices had increased, and we tracked this using inflation over the period, then the increase in food prices had to be compared relative to that increase in prices. So there were two adjustments--one for the exchange rate and one for increases in the general price level. Source: Author's construction based on IMF Primary Commodity Database and Renewable Fuels Association. Information for mandates is from Slayton and Timmer (2008) and Timmer (2008) . Based on a graph by Slayton and Timmer (2008) . 
